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ABSTRACT
Principles of modern cyber-physical system (CPS) analysis are based on analytical methods that de-
pend on whether safety or liveness requirements are considered. Complexity is abstracted through
different techniques, ranging from stochastic modelling to contracts. However, both distributed
heuristics and Artificial Intelligence (AI)-based approaches as well as the user perspective or un-
predictable effects, such as accidents or the weather, introduce enough uncertainty to warrant
reinforcement-learning-based approaches. This paper compares traditional approaches in the do-
main of CPS modelling and analysis with the AI researcher perspective to exploring unknown com-
plex systems.
Keywords Cyber-Physical Systems · Neural Network Control · Multi-Agent Systems · Reinforcement Learning ·
Cyber-Physical Systems security
1 Introduction
The notion of cyber-physical systems (CPS) describes the combination of Information and Communication Technology
(ICT) and software (the “cyber” part) with physical components. A CPS can emerge from embedded systems by
internetworking them. The first big research program focusing on CPS has been started by the US National Science
Foundation in 2006, where the term CPS is defined in as such that it “refers to the tight conjoining of and coordination
between computational and physical resources,” stating “[w]e envision that the cyber-physical systems of tomorrow
will far exceed those of today in terms of adaptability, autonomy, efficiency, functionality, reliability, safety, and
usability” [1].
While the notion of CPS by the U.S. National Science Foundation, as outlined above, includes ICT, it does not
explicitly name Artificial Intelligence (AI) as a necessary component to raise an embedded system to the status of a
CPS. Yet, the availability of sensory data together with a communications system and the ability to exert actions upon
the physical world that have been planned for the whole compound of embedded systems components readily suggests
that issues of planning, the increase of reflectivity, efficiency, and lowering resource usage is achieved by increasing
the “intelligence” of the overall system. As such, researchers in the domain of AI have found numerous application
domains.
However, the two worlds of CPS and AI usually operate on different terms: CPS require operation within well-defined
boundaries, i.e., as far as possible deterministic behavior within well-known, strictly enforced margins of error. In
contrast, many AI techniques—Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs) foremost—are firmly rooted in the domain of
statistics, which is probably very well seen in the ANN training process.
Analyzing Cyber-Physical Systems from the Perspective of Artificial Intelligence A PREPRINT
There is already some history in investigating howAI can form an integral part of a high-assurance system, such as CPS
typically are. This is the core of the first perspective we outline in this paper, namely, the research question of how to
bring systems with AI-components whose verification is inherently difficult, such as distributed heuristics employing
Multi Agent Systems (MAS) or ANNs, into the domain of CPS, where verificationmethods are necessary to avoid high
risks in terms of costs, or even life. Examples from the power system domain are COHDA [2] or Winzent [3]–[6] that
both manage real power generation and consumption schedules using a distributed approach. In the case of COHDA,
the system constitutes a distributed heuristic, whereas Winzent is deterministic, but relies on ANNs for generation
and consumption forecasts. Schumann and Liu [7] compiled further contributions in which the authors first revisit
the robust control, then discussing in all following chapters topics such as ANN complexity analysis; control system
design and test; stability, convergence, and verification; as well as anomaly detection featuring ANNs at their core.
The applications range from automotive, submarine and aircraft control to power systems management and medical
systems. A more recent summary, albeit focusing exclusively on the domain of highly automated vehicles, is given by
Damm, Fränzle, Gerwinn, et al. [8].
This paper is written by and for AI researchers, carefully reviewing the literature from two perspectives: First, the
inclusion of AI components into CPS, outlining challenges and recent contributions, emphasizing the differences and
specific requirements of the CPS domain to AI. This first aspect considers the analysis of AI techniques such as MAS
or Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) in the context of CPS, where the complexity in inherent statistical non-determinism
of AI components need to be tamed. The second aspect turns the tables on the CPS-AI relationship and considers the
increase of stability of a CPS through AI: Here, AI is used to analyze aspects in the behavior of CPS, reaching points
in a complex search space of systems behavior that are hard to conquer with traditional analysis methods.
In the domain of CPS, two key types of requirements are considered: Liveness and safety requirements. The first
is colloquially expressed as “something good eventually happens,” whereas the mnemonic for the latter is “nothing
bad ever happens.” Clearly, considering those requirements, the focus rests on safety requirements with regards to AI
in the context of CPS; we will honor this and touch liveness requirements rather lightly where they are connected to
safety requirements.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: We give a brief introduction to the relevant fundamentals of CPS
modelling and analysis in Section 2. We then describe how programs can be derived from a formal specification in
Section 1. In Section 4, we provide a summary how ANNs that serve as the controller in a CPS are being tested for
safety requirements. We move on to a whole-system view in Section 1 and present common simulation frameworks.
Extended the topic from Deep Learning (DL) to a broad AI perspective, we take MAS into consideration in Section 1,
paying specific attention to the communication between distributed systems. Finally, Section 1 outlines techniques
to derive attach vectors against specific CPS and summarize recent efforts for automatic analysis of CPS through AI
methods.
2 Analyzing Cypber-Physical Systems for Safety Requirements: A Primer
In this section, we give a brief primer on the fundamentals relevant in the context of the work at hand. It serves mainly
as an introduction for scientists from other domains, most notably AI, who are not familiar with the approaches and
basic assumptions of CPS analysis. Interested readers are referred to textbooks such as the one by Alur [9].
When specifying a CPS, one needs to consider liveness and safety requirements. These two express different types of
requirements, memorizable through the two sentences given in the introduction. Alur [9] gives a simple example that
illustrates the difference very well. Consider a railway with two tracks, one for each direction, leading to a bridge. The
bridge is narrow such that only one track fits on it, i.e., the two tracks merge at both ends of the bridge. This critical
section is, of course, guarded by signals on both ends. The safety requirement of this simple system can be expressed
by the following property:
TrainSafety : ¬ [(modeW = bridge) ∧ (modeE = bridge)] .
Hence, two trains arriving at the west end (W) and east end (E) of the bridge must wait; thus, the safety requirement
ensures that “nothing bad ever happens.” However, the property does not present a solution: The two trains halt, but
from the property alone, none enters the bridge. This requirement that “one train eventually enters the bridge” is
expressed by the system’s liveness requirements, i.e., “something good eventually happens.” Notice the presence of
the word “eventually,” which indicates a temporal dimension to the situation that is sorely missing from the simple
property above.
Any CPS does not simply come to live in the form of source code or hardware; instead, it relies on a formal specification
first. Formal languages allow to express the behavior of a system. The formal specification serves as the basis to reason
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about the system itself and is also the ultimate tool to verify whether an actual implementation follows the intended
behavior or not. One of the commonly used specification formalisms is temporal logic, specifically its variant Metric
Temporal Logic (MTL). TheMTL formalism consists of propositional variables, the logical operators¬ and∨, and the
temporal modal operators UI (“ϕ until in Iψ”) and SI (“ϕ since in Iψ. Here, ϕ and ψ represent any valid formula in
MTL, and I denotes a temporal interval. If I is omitted, [0;∞) is implicitly assumed. Metric Interval Temporal Logic
(MITL) adds “syntactic sugar” to MTL by replacing commonly used constructs with dedicated operators. According
to Ouaknine and Worrell [10], MTL/MITL are the dominating formalism for describing real-time systems.
The task of falsifying a system is coupled with a CPS’ safety requirements, i.e., “nothing bad ever happens.” Obvi-
ously, if just one counterexample can be found for a specification, then the system’s safety requirements are defied.
Consequently, for many CPS that harbour Machine Learning (ML) components, finding inputs that yield grotesquely
wrong outputs is a required, but not a simple task. Temporal logic has a long history; Øhrstrøm and Hasle [11] give a
very good account in this regard.
In first-order logic, an expression over a set of variables V is evaluated with respect to the valuation for V . In temporal
logic, a formula ϕ is valuated with respect to an infinite sequence of valuations over V . The problem of checking
whether a given model and its behavior satisfies its specification expressed in temporal logic by at least one formula
ϕ is called model checking. Model checking has been developed independently by Clarke and Emerson (the book by
Clarke Jr, Grumberg, Kroening, et al. [12] is an integral part of the standard literature corpus in this field), and Queille
and Sifakis [13], [14] in the early 1980s. When checking for safety requirements, one tries to falsify, i.e., find a
valuation for which the model and specification differ. Obviously, only one such case is enough to defy a CPS’ safety
requirements. Algorithmic falsification techniques have been implemented, employing stochastic search strategies
and nonlinear optimization methods. These pieces of software, such as Breach [15], S-TaLiRo [16], C2E2 [17], and
RRT-REX [18] are mostly the basis or baseline for novel approaches presented in Section 4.
Until now, we have assumed that the specification and the model—or even the system—already exist. Considering
green-field projects, this isn’t the case, of course. Then, one usually starts out by sketching the requirements. An
earlier publication by Clarke and Emerson [19] considers the process of arriving at a program expressed as a flowchart.
Finally, to follow the line of thought further, the specification itself must be correct. Checking theorems for their
correctness is called theorem proving. Employing programs for this, i.e., enabling automated theory proving, has a
long history—being essentially based on the works by Aristotle, Frege [20]–[22], Russell and Whitehead [23], and
Skolem and Löwenhein [24], [25]—and has made enormous advances in the past years, being now routinely employed
in the industry. E.g., the Intel Pentium FDIV bug [26] has firmly established automated theorem proving in the CPU
industry. Examples for concrete implementations come from Gordon and Melham [27], utilizing higher-order logic,
and Owre, Rushby, and Shankar [28]. An in-depth overview and examples are offered by Kaufmann, Manolios, and
Moore [29].
In checking all stages of the design process, from creating the model, deriving the implementation, checking the
implementation’s requirements and finally monitoring its behavior during runtime, one tries to achieve end-to-end
correctness of the CPS. There is no fixed recipe for all steps; Desai, Dreossi, and Seshia [30] present a not too old
approach from traditional CPS design where ML does explicitly not form an integral part of the CPS, which is why it
is exactly a good example in this regard. The example the authors present is a surveillance drone that patrols a fixed
route via waypoints. In their approach, the (reactive) robotics software is first tested via model checking. Then, the
safety requirements are noted in Signal Temporal Logic (STL) and verified to hold continuously at runtime.
Another factor that makes the previously mentioned publication a good example is the programming language the
authors employ for the software: P. Presented by Desai, Jackson, and Zufferey [31], its main paradigms are asyn-
chronous control flow that is event-driven. As textbooks about CPS usually explain in the very first chapters, those
systems are reactive—probably one of the major paradigm gaps between the two domains, CPS and AI, since a major
part of the latter strives to develop proactive systems.
Seshia, Sadigh, and Sastry [32] bring this difference to the point, emphasizing that the concept of verified AI that would
fit the CPS domain would have “strong, ideally provable, assurances of correctness with respect to mathematically-
specified requirements,” while ML methods and models such as DNNs that are being trained with “millions of data
points” can exhibit close to stochastic behavior. The authors argue that bridging this gap can be done through training
and test data generation. The focus on data and how it interacts with ML models is further deepened in Section 1.
3 Synthesis Methods
Considering the previous section, it becomes obvious that reasoning about a CPS involves a formal specification as
well as a program that follows it. The specification is a high-level description of what the final system should do and
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ideally, the implementation in hard- and software follows this specification. Bridging these two levels of abstraction
poses not one, but two questions: First, does a piece of software that was written according to a specification match
the intended behavior expressed by this specification in all cases? And second, is there instead a way to generate
a program that complies with the high-level specification? Formal synthesis is the latter process, i.e., generating a
program from a high-level specification.
Jha and Seshia [33] present a framework in this regard that combines ML and formal synthesis, i.e., a framework in
inductive synthesis. Inductive synthesis—described, e.g., in by Gold [34], Shapiro [35], and Summers [36]—seeks to
find a program that matches a set of input/output pairs. At high level, inductive synthesis is an instance of learning from
examples, commonly known also as inductive inference or machine learning. This connection can be deduced very
easily from the works of Angluin and Smith [37], and Russell and Norvig [38]. The framework proposed treats the
synthesis as a problem of language learning. However, Jha and Seshia [33] also clearly note the differences between a
program synthesis and the usualML approach, which manifests itself not just in concept classes the learning algorithms
are applied to, but specifically in the difference of exact learning and approximate learning. The latter is the typical
ML task, where driving the training error down to zero is often not necessary or even not desirable (as it would indicate
overfitting), whereas a program synthesis cannot get away with being a correct program 98% of the time.
Another aspect of synthesis methods is parameter synthesis. In this case, a formal description exists, e.g., in STL, as
well as a model, but the STL formulæ lack concrete signal or time values. This means that the general behavior of a
system is known, but threshold or critical values are not. Jin, Donzé, Deshmukh, et al. [39] propose an algorithm to
mine requirements from closed-loop control models, in which the inputs to their algorithm is the plant model as well as
a requirement template expressed in parametric STL. The algorithm guarantees a tight formulation of the parameters,
i.e., parameter values are as close to the actual limits of the system as possible. The overall approach is helpful to, e.g.,
validate future versions of the CPS.
4 Neural Control Falsification
Neural control describes a CPS in which an ANN takes the role of a controller, replacing a complex traditional
controller, such as a closed-loop system. Their falsification is based on the system’s safety requirements, i.e., the part
expressing that “nothing bad every happens.” Consequently, one counterexample defies this, which is ultimately the
goal of any falsification technique. Whatever “bad” means is dependent on the actual system and the world it is being
deployed in; in an Autonomous Vehicle (AV), this can range from the misclassification of an object or human being to
an actual collision.
When an ANN is used as a controller, problems of Adversarial Learning (AL), as they are studied in the domain of AI,
of course also apply to the use ANNs as controllers in CPS. In AL, an adversarial sample constitutes a sample that is
presented to an ML and that features only minimal perturbation compared to a legitimate sample, but causes the ML
model to exhibit a starkly wrong result. Well-known examples of AL have been observed in e-mails in the early days
of spam filtering, where a blacklisted word such as viagra was modified to read víâg R©á and therefore still readable
to humans as the same word, but caused to offending e-mail to escape spam filters. The problem emerges especially
in the domain of deep learning, where complex ANNs can, e.g., misclassify images when only a minimal amount of
RGB noise is added to the picture.
The foundation of computer vision that is prominently used for AVs are Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs).
Although they have a long history and automatic training with backpropagation of error has been shown by LeCun,
Boser, Denker, et al. [40] in 1989, only the advent of General-Purpose Graphics Processing Units (GPGPUs) have
made effective training possible. The well-documented work by Cires¸an, Meier, Gambardella, et al. [41] marks one of
the major achievements in this regard. However, effective adversarial samples have been quickly found; an impressive
account has been made by Nguyen, Yosinski, and Clune [42]. Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy [43] offer an in-depth
explanation of AL in the context of DL, arguing that the primary reason for the effectiveness of adversarial samples is
the linear nature of certain ANNs.
Recently, researchers have worked on methods to test ANNs against adversarial examples, both with and without
knowledge of the neural network’s inner structure. Papernot, McDaniel, Goodfellow, et al. [44] thoroughly demon-
strate practical black-box attacks after previously noting the general limitations of DL in adversarial settings [45].
Chen, Zhang, Sharma, et al. [46] recount how black-box attacks use substitute models trained on the target ANN, ex-
ploiting the fact that adversarial samples (e.g., adversarial images) are highly transferable. In their paper, the authors
then employ zeroth order optimization methods to directly estimate the gradients of the target model to effectively
generate adversarial samples without needing a substitute model.
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Where black-box testing of ANNs assumes no prior knowledge of the networks themselves, white-box tests specifically
trace the activation of neurons given certain inputs in order to derive minimal changes to valid samples to arrive at
adversarial samples. With DeepXplore, one of the first frameworks for white-box testing of DL ANNs, Pei, Cao,
Yang, et al. [47] present a framework that introduces neuron coverage to measure the activation of parts of the ANN
in order to then derive adversarial samples. Manual testing of correct or incorrect behavior of the overall system
is achieved by cross-linking oracles, which, in this case, are other DL systems with similar functionality. In this
work, deriving adversarial samples with high neuron coverage is represented as optimization problem that is subject to
efficient gradient-descent methods. DeepXplore has already been the basis for several CPS-specific frameworks, such
as DeepTest by Tian, Pei, Jana, et al. [48] that aims at testing AVs driven by DNNs.
With AI2, Gehr, Mirman, Drachsler-Cohen, et al. [49] propose a sound analyzer for DNNs. The key building block is
the transformation of operations in the ANN to conditional affine transformations, i.e., affine transformations guarded
by logical constraints. This allows to treat the elements of the DNN in abstract domains such that property verification,
specifically of robustness properties, is possible. As reasoning of robustness and safety properties of ANNs is enabled
through AI2, this bridges the world of ANNs and classic abstract reasoning of CPS. One side effect of the proposed
methodology is the restriction of AI2 to only certain kinds of activation functions and network layouts, namely ReLU,
max pooling, and convolutional layers that make a feed-forward/convolutional neural network.
All white-box falsification methods currently attack feed-forward ANNs, with CNNs being a variant thereof. This
makes sense, considering that CNNs find application in the computer vision discipline, where CNNs are currently
the best structure for image/object classification. With Capsule Networks that differ from CNNs especially through
their dynamic routing concept between capsules, Sabour, Frosst, and Hinton [50] have proposed a ANN architecture
that addresses some of the shortcomings of CNNs, e.g., that a CNN happily detects a normal human face even if the
eyes are located on the chin. However, capsule networks still cannot be efficiently trained; but of course, this is being
worked on [51], [52]. Another reason for tackling feed-forward networks first is the inherent complexity of other
ANN architectures: Feed-forward networks approximate any Borel-measurable function; for this claim exist no less
than three proofs, the most often cited ones being developed by Hornik, Stinchcombe, and White [53], and Cybenko
[54].
In between white- and black-box testing is gray-box testing, in which some knowledge of the underlying model is
assumed to be known, but no full analytical coverage is desired. Dreossi, Donzé, and Seshia [55] develop a hybrid,
gray-box approach, assuming some internal knowledge of the ML components within the CPS. The authors assume
these components to be classifiers, specifically binary classifiers, rightfully implying that any multi-class classifier can
be turned into a binary classifier without loss of generality. The two parts—the CPS specified in STL, and the ML
component—are then separately analyzed. Then, they assume a variant of the CPS modelM the authors denote with
M+, in which the ML component is perfect. From this point, considering only the CPS component described by the
STL formula ϕ, the two sets of inputs toM+ U+ϕ and U
+
¬ϕ are computed. The second part of the falsification engine
then tries to identify inputs contained in U+ϕ for which the ML component fails. The ML classifier is replaced by a
simpler approximation operating on an abstracted feature space; sampling of the desired points from the thus simplified
feature space is done with quasi-Monte Carlo techniques building on the discrepancy notion from equidistribution
theory [56], [57]. The authors’ case study utilizes the Unity-Udacity AV simulator in which a CNN needs to detect a
cow and initiate emergency braking.
In a similar vein, Yaghoubi and Fainekos [58] present a state-of-the-art, effective framework in this regard. Addition-
ally to the black-box approach of knowing inputs and outputs, they extract dynamic model linearizations along the
systems’ trajectories, arguing that this kind of information is readily available via, e.g., the Simulink linear analysis
toolbox anyways. This linearization around the trajectories is used to apply gradient descent in order to yield a valid
input similar to the original one, but with a negative robustness value, i.e., the falsification. The input search space
is not constraint by this approach, which is a further advantage. The authors claim that their framework outperforms
black-box system testing methods, showing in case studies shorter times to falsification as well as consistently finding
falsifications where the methods chosen for comparison fail. In their experimental results, they choose uniform random
sampling and simulated annealing implementations of S-TaLiRo [16] the baseline to beat. Sadly, black-box testing
methods such as the previously discussed one by Chen, Zhang, Sharma, et al. [46], a comparison with approach by
Dreossi, Donzé, and Seshia [55]—which the authors explicitly cite—, or even white-box testing methods, are absent
from the case studies.
The most striking difference between the two frameworks by Dreossi, Donzé, and Seshia [55], and Yaghoubi and
Fainekos [58] lies in utilizing ideas from optimal control theory [58]–[61], meaning that the frameworks consider
system-level building blocks instead of only the controlling ANN. An advantage of this approach in comparison to
DeepXplore, AI2, and similar white-box methods, however, is their framework’s ability to falsify Recurrent Neural
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Network (RNN) controllers, which Yaghoubi and Fainekos [58] also show in one case study; Dreossi, Donzé, and
Seshia [55] specifically refer to DeepXplore with regards to this fact.
Future directions seem already clearly dictated. Seidl and Lorenz [62] and Siegelmann and Sontag [63] have shown
that RNNs are approximators of dynamic systems, a fact accommodated by Yaghoubi and Fainekos [58]. Apart
from serving as controllers, applications for RNNs are twofold: One is the classical forecasting from historical data.
One such forecasting that can serve as the example for the whole concept is short-term load forecasting in power
grids, where the decisions derived from the forecast of an RNN obviously influence the behavior of the CPS power
grid. Bianchi, Maiorino, Kampffmeyer, et al. [64] give a recent comparison of Elman simple RNNs [65], Wavelet
networks [66], Long-Short Term Memory (LSTM) cells [67], and Gated Recurrent Units (GRUs) [66]. The second
aspect calls on the notion of the digital twin, i.e., “a dynamic virtual representation of a physical object or system
across its lifecycle, using real-time data to enable understanding, learning and reasoning,” according to Bolton,McColl-
Kennedy, Cheung, et al. [68]. This idea specifically enables Deep Reinforcement Learning (RL), which has become
a huge topic of interest since the hallmark publication of Mnih, Kavukcuoglu, Silver, et al. [69]. Clearly, the “trial
and error” approach of RL calls for a simulation model in the context of critical CPS. Finally, the Differentiable
Neural Computer (DNC), proposed by Graves, Wayne, Reynolds, et al. [70], with an RNN serving as a controller in a
differentiable Von-Neumann architecture with externalmemory, promises to approximate algorithms, further widening
the capabilities of DL modules that will find their way into CPS.
5 Simulation-based Testing Frameworks
Once the environment becomes increasingly complex, analytical methods as mentioned in the previous sections fall
short in providing real-world, i.e., realistic inputs. While the methods mentioned in Section 4 can be used to derive in-
puts that falsify a model, they are not necessarily guaranteed to actually appear in a production environment. Consider
an autonomous vehicle as the CPS: Another car flying upside down from one building to anothermight certainly trigger
a wrong driving decision by the neural controller, but are not very likely to be perceived in a real-world environment.
In this regard, Tuncali, Fainekos, Ito, et al. [71] propose simulation-based generation of adversarial samples. In con-
trast to traditional synthesis or verification methods, in which an understanding of the system exists and is expressed
by, e.g., STL or contracts, simulation-based analysis treats the CPS as black-boxmodel. The authors describe methods
to pertubate testing scenario parameter configurations, i.e., they seek to find scenarios that lead to unexpected behav-
ior. Their research is motivated by the status quo of ANN verification that is only very limitedly possible as ANNs
correspond to complex nonlinear and non-convex functions. Even though the generation of adversarial examples is
studied intensively, the authors explain that simulation-based generation of adversarial samples constitutes a similar
problem in the name only: AL, as it is studied in the domain of deep learning, focuses on one ANN and therefore deals
with the falsification of an ANN at component level, whereas the proposed simulation-based approach is a falsification
approach at system level, where the ANN is just one component in a complex CPS.
Kelly and Rodionova [72] argue that a simulation might work with synthetic data or variations on the simulation
scenario configuration, but that this still leaves an enormous search space in which realistic situations represent only a
smaller portion of the overall data. They add that collisions or blandly wrong decisions by a neural network controller
are interesting, but far more often dangerous or “near-miss” situations in an AV driving scenario are just as interesting,
but harder to detect. The authors acknowledge that sophisticated world simulators are necessary to provide the AV’s
perception pipeline with realistic data and, based on this, incorporate the video game Grand Theft Auto V into their
simulator as the world in which the AV is driving. Their approach also differs in that the simulator does not explicitly
force dangerous situations, but instead tries to log sufficient miles for an expressive test.
In general, pertinent literature stresses that not the software, but the model of the simulated world is the major chal-
lenge in any simulation task. Lobao and Porto [73], and Robinson [74], [75] specifically argue how, as scope and
complexity of the model increase, model confidence and even accuracy finally decrease. CPS, with a combination of
different domains, are also prone to suffer from another problem with regards to simulation: There is no single sim-
ulation software that covers multiple domains. An ICT simulator cannot cover the intricacies of simulating a power
system or present the perception pipeline of an AV with realistic images. To address this problem, co-simulation is
a viable approach. It assumes that the best possible course is to couple domain-specific simulators, synchronizing
them and allowing them to exchange data. Gomes, Thule, Broman, et al. [76] offer a more detailed argumentation and
description of the specific challenges; Nguyen, Besanger, Tran, et al. [77] and Palensky, Van Der Meer, Lopez, et al.
[78] focus on the specifics of co-simulation in the power systems domain.
With regards to software that facilitates co-simulation, radically different approaches exist. On the simpler end of
the spectrum, we can note mosaik [79]. It synchronizes simulators on a request-response communication schema,
acting as a “data kraken” in which the experimenter connects communicating models from different simulators via the
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attributes they announce tomosaik; requesting data on a time step using the get_datamethod and delivering data prior
to executing a time step using the step method. mosaik is, therefore, agnostic to the inner workings of simulators or
their models. In contrast, Ptolemy II [80] focuses not just on simulation, but also on modeling and design of concurrent
components. Including techniques such as actor-driven execution, Ptolemy II is a grey-box co-simulation approach
where mosaik treats all simulators as black boxes, requesting only compliance to the communication protocol as the
smallest common denominator.
Besides concrete implementations, co-simulation can be governed by a standard for support both model exchange and
co-simulation of dynamic models. The Functional Mock-Up Interface (FMI) [81] uses a combination of eXtensible
Markup Language (XML) documents and generated C code to bridge different simulators without forcing a particular
toolset or execution scheme. A good illustration how extensive co-simulation can be employed in the context of AVs
as CPS is provided by the key findings document of the ENABLE-S3 EU research project [82].
6 Multi Agent Systems and Deterministic Communication in Cyber-Physical Systems
The perspective of AI has, until now, been very much focused on ML, giving much space to DL models. Obviously,
this is too narrow: Russell and Norvig [38] describe AI in terms of rational agents, or, more broadly, “intelligent
entities” that learn, solve problems, and act based on their own goals and model of their environment. This is, con-
sidering standard works such as the textbook by Wooldridge [83], where they ultimately distinguish themselves from
the classical CPS software: While the latter is always reactive, agents are, except for the simplest forms, proactive,
meaning that they act, with a specific level of autonomy, towards a goal or to maximize a utility function regardless of
whether they receive input from their environment or not. Together with the uncertainty of ML models, this proactive-
ness provides for the next stark contrast to the traditional CPS domain. Additionally, many agent designs introduce a
social component: There is not one, but several agents, collaborating through a communication protocol, evolving it
to a MAS. From the perspective of a CPS, a better—and more specific—name is that of agent-based control systems,
combining both aspects, that of autonomy and that of exerting control over physical components [84].
While the basic assumptions of the different domains seem to contradict each other, the Divide-et-Impera approach
computer science inheres in appeals to tackle complex problems even in critical infrastructures and CPS. Examples
include the aforementioned Universal Smart Grid Agent [5], designs by Nieße, Lehnhoff, Tröschel, et al. [85] and
Schwerdfeger and Westermann [86], where ancillary services, including frequency control, are provided for power
grids through MAS, as well as an earlier summary by McArthur, Davidson, Catterson, et al. [87], [88], crossing to
other domains such as autonomous driving, where Dresner and Stone [89] employ a MAS for traffic management at
intersections, or Hallé and Chaib-draa [90] present a collaborative driving system modelled through a MAS. When we
assume that the previous paragraphs cover the internals of each agent, what defines the overall behavior of the MAS
is their communication, being the agents’ protocol from the sense of data encoding as well as a behavioral protocol.
ICT protocols are usually far from being deterministic; the analysis of Veres and Boda [91] in terms of the stochastic
nature of the congestion control algorithm of the well-known Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) may serve as a
pars-pro-toto example.
In general, the divide-et-impera approach of MAS lets the foundation of distributed computing surface: consensus
problems. This is not solely related to agents with their proactive behavior based on goals or utility functions; prob-
lems such as distributed timekeeping and distributed snapshotting with classical publications by Chandy and Lamport
[92] and Mattern [93] are well known. In this understanding, software agents constitute the technical realization of
distributed algorithms, paving the way for a more integrated view on distributed systems and AI. Reaching consensus—
i.e., the question of convergence of a protocol—becomes more difficult to reason compared to locally running algo-
rithms due to the distributed nature of an MAS, where time delays in transmission are not deterministic. Olfati-Saber,
Fax, and Murray [94] provide a valuable review of newer consensus and cooperation protocols as well as ways to
model consensus as control loops and using graph theory to qualitatively and quantitatively determine convergence.
Eventual convergence is obviously not guaranteed; Hanachi and Sibertin-Blanc [95] and Matt, Toni, and Dionysiou
[96] show the non-trivial nature of convergence. Convergence is still different from making sure that a deal is always
possible, as Faratin, Sierra, and Jennings [97] state.
One of the ancestral behavioral protocols for MAS is the Contract Net Protcol by Smith [98]. Here, agents announce
tasks using broadcast messages for other agents to bid on. The announcement also contains the ranking process,
i.e., bids delivered by other agents are ranked according to metrics such as estimated time to task completion. The
announcer, or task manager, then awards the task to a specific node, informing all other nodes in the process. The
awarded node can then additionally choose to break the task up into smaller subtasks and sub-contract them through a
similar procedure.
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The general broadcast-bidding-awarding structure of behavior laid down in the Contract Net Procol has influenced
many (negotiation) protocols for distributed computation. In many cases, additional ideas are brought in to add effi-
ciency, to speed up the negotiation, or to reduce the amount of messages or data being sent. The Lightweight Power
Exchange Protocol (LPEP) [3], [5] specifies initial messages (requests for or offers of power) as broadcasts, but models
the overlay networks the agents use on the power grid in which the agents’ physical entities represent, imposing rules
on message routing that limit message propagation, introducing the concept of dynamic neighborhoods where supply
and demand have as little physical line meter between them as possible, reducing the line loss. Responses are routed
directly through a dynamic routing table on each node that is being built during the request stage.
Additionally, Shen and Norrie [99] worked towards eschewing the initial broadcast stage. They employ multicasting—
i.e., the network protocol concept [100]—for the task announcement messages, creating interest groups to which
agents can subscribe. Wanyama and Homayoun Far [101] reduce the number of negotiation rounds until consensus
is reached, limiting the scope of agent coalitions to a group-choice problem and basing their negotiation approach on
game theory, replacing explicit knowledge through message exchanges by implicit knowledge coming from a game-
theoretic model of the negotiation process. Garcia, Cao, and Casbeer [102] have reduced the number of messages per
negotiation, assuming a control theory problem behind the agents’ communication and implementing an asynchronous,
event-based protocol based on a discretized model that is decoupled from the state of the agent’s neighbors.
The aforementioned publication by Olfati-Saber, Fax, and Murray [94] also emphasizes the effectiveness of neigh-
borhood concepts, based on small-world networks by Watts and Strogatz [103]—being one of the hallmark works on
overlay topologies for distributed computing—, and referring to the weightings introduced by Xiao and Boyd [104].
The two works heavily influenced the later, much-celebrated small-world model for MAS by Olfati-Saber [105]. The
COHDA protocol by Hinrichs, Lehnhoff, and Sonnenschein [2] builds on the small-world model; Nieße, Bremer, and
Lehnhoff [106] also note that fast convergence or the quantitative guarantee of convergence do not necessarily mean
that the optimal solution to a problem is found, but that the ICT overlay network topology influences the search for a
solution with certain MAS protocols.
In the context of a CPS, fully decentralized MAS approaches to a problem can be viewed with suspicion. After all,
there is no way to control or “look into” the process as it happens. The statement of the convergence problem by
Hanachi and Sibertin-Blanc [95] mentioned above is approached by the authors through a protocol moderator, i.e., an
explicit middleman. Similarly, for COHDA, Nieße and Tröschel [107] propose an observer-controller architecture for
the in its core completely decentralized protocol. The questions these approaches rise is whether how certain behavior
can be formulated as being expected, rather than just exhibited. It is expressed in the move from specifications to
contracts in component design.
The idea of contracts has been and applied by Meyer [108] in his famous and influencing Eiffel programming language,
where a class—in the sense of object-oriented programming—is considered an invariant and a class’ methods are ex-
tended with preconditions and postconditions state predicates. As long as the preconditions hold, a method’s contracts
with the outside world are fulfilled; when the method’s postconditions hold, the method fulfills the contracts the rest
of the world expects from it. As such, a contract is a component model specifying what the component expects from
its environment, and the ensuing promises guaranteed by the component under correct use. The ideas implemented in
Eiffel root in seminal work by Dijkstra [109] and Lamport [110] (weakest preconditions and predicate transformers);
the books by Back and Wright [111] and Back and Wright [112] are probably the standard works for reasoning about
discrete, untimed process behavior: The refinement calculus describes processes operating on shared variables using
guarded commands.
Dill [113] describes a model based on behaviors exhibited by a component, called traces, that is asynchronous in
nature. It has been extended to a discrete synchronous model by Dill [114]; De Alfaro and Henzinger [115] have
proposed a concept similar to synchronous trace structures, called interface automata, which has later seen extension
to resources and asynchronous behaviors. Process spaces, developed by Negulescu [116], and the agent algebra by
Passerone and Sangiovanni-Vincentelli [117] offer a more general approach to generic behaviors and draw heavily
from the algebraic approach by Burch, Passerone, and Sangiovanni-Vincentelli [118]. Note that the term “agent” in
the agent algebra is, “[. . . ] a generic term that includes software processes, hardware circuits and physical components,
and abstractions thereof,” [117] i.e., not necessarily an autonomous software agent in line with the descriptions of the
previous paragraphs. Nevertheless, the extensive theory of the agent algebra is valuable in this regard.
Obviously, the notion of “expectations from the environment” and ensuing “guarantees to the environment, given the
expectations are met” are extremely valuable to reason about components, specifically distributed components, such as
a MAS provides. Generally, especially since agents can form coalitions (i.e., aggregate and disaggregate dynamically),
contracts based on such dynamic components are hard to formulate. Vokrˇínek, Bíba, Hodík, et al. [119] propose a
protocol that includes checking for contract compliance and evaluating the overall performance of the contractor. They
include the concept of penalties for contractors into the protocol, making penalties dynamic as part of the bidding
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process. Realizing that executing a contract cannot be enforced without implying a specific reason—the node may
become offline due to a failure as well as being malicious—the authors do not specify what penalties are, or what
the result of a penalty is. I.e., there is no “penalty announcement” to other nodes that would affect further biddings
between the contractor and a different contractee. However, developing such a social dynamic in MAS with all their
implications is no simple task; specifically since one must realize that this are ex post mechanisms, i.e., the damage
is already done when these mechanisms are set in motion. Huynh, Jennings, and Shadbolt [120] and Schmidt, Steele,
Dillon, et al. [121] propose trust models for MAS that try to take initial mistrust into account. However, this may
not be enough for not violating any safety requirement; additionally, a hitherto fully trustworthy node may fail even
though it has a high trust score (e.g., due to an outage).
7 Deriving Attack Vectors on Cyber-Physical Systems
Even when a CPS is hardened against adversarial inputs, this does not necessarily mean that an actual attack is consid-
ered. Remember that adversarial inputs are, in general, any input that foils the model into emitting a wrong response,
such as a misclassification of an image. Adversarial inputs are not per se malicious, but can constitute such input or
a modified input that triggers false behavior. E.g., Dodge and Karam [122] analyze the effects of image quality on
DNNs; but JPEG compression artifacts do not necessarily constitute an attack on the model.
In a twist of the AL concept, attacks can be staged against the communication, the very nerves of a CPS. This is not
only limited to exploiting bugs in the implementation of protocols, such as parsers; testing of this lower level of an
agent’s communication stack can be done using fuzzers—the work by Gorbunov and Rosenbloom [123] can be seen
as exemplary of this—, but extends to crafting datagrams that are valid, but expose logic errors or other unwanted
behavior in an MAS. Further, the difference between bad data injection and AL in general lies in the target: AL
specifically targets an ANN serving as controller, taking the idiosyncrasies of the ML aspect into account. Bad data
injection considers the whole CPS, trying to fool traditional status monitoring mechanisms that usually serve as the
most trusted input to CPS’ controller. For this to work, the exact domain of the CPS must be known; in contrast
to the AL aspect, that targets the ANN controller, but can otherwise remain agnostic to the domain-specific parts of
the actual CPS, bad data injections works because it targets the exact behavior and inner workings of the monitoring
devices. Works that study this kind of malicious attack are largely based on analyses of undetectable errors—and not
attacks—in otherwise legitimate CPS states, such as those Clements, Krumpholz, and Davis [124] and Wu and Liu
[125] discuss. One of the basic findings in this regard, shown, e.g., by Sandberg, Teixeira, and Johansson [126], is that
an attacker has to compromise more readings than just the one she targets.
Specifically, Teixeira, Amin, Sandberg, et al. [127] analyze bad data injection in the context of cyber security of power
grid state estimators. The specific goal is to inject such data that the state estimation algorithm still converges, i.e.,
the data must appear to be meaningful—specifics on state estimation algorithms and their convergence behavior can
be found in textbooks such as the one by Abur and Exposito [128], as well as publications targeting the apparent
convergence problems such as the neural state estimation approach by Manitsas, Singh, Pal, et al. [129]—, and thus
the attack remains stealthy. A successful attack diverges the thus assumed state awareness from the actual state of
the power grid. In contrast to an earlier publication by Liu, Ning, and Reiter [130], the authors can relax the attacker
knowledge required to only partial or even outdated knowledge about the power grid, which can be obtained from the
data some Remote Terminal Units (RTUs) send to the control center using statistical models. Teixeira, Amin, Sandberg,
et al. [127] give an analytical margin on the amount of knowledge the attacker needs for a successful injection.
How attacks on a CPS need only partial information about the CPS itself is demonstrated by Ju and Lin [131]. Here,
the authors assume that an attacker has gained control over a generator, such as a wind turbine or Photovoltaic (PV)
plant. The attacker’s goal is to inflict damage by leveraging the reactive power control mechanisms present in any
medium voltage grid. To this end, she only needs the general knowledge of the control rules for reactive power
injection or consumption, which is very easy to come by. The attack works with distributed generators and explicitly
without knowledge of the power grid’s layout or other assets present in the grid. Specifically, she also does not need to
compromise the communication between nodes, an aspect the other works referenced in the previous paragraphs focus
on as premise for the attack to work. The authors show analytically that damage through voltage disruption based on
twice the available reactive power available can be inflicted by the attacker with nearly no knowledge.
Gao, Xie, Solar-Lezama, et al. [132] also provide an approach for automated vulnerability analysis of state estimators.
This one, too, is based on false data injection and considers stealthy attacks. It differs from the investigation by
Teixeira, Amin, Sandberg, et al. [127] through the approach, as it encodes the problem as logic-based vulnerability
analysis, presenting an approach called symbolic propagation to allow successful attacks from only a localized set of
nodes. The authors use satisfiability modulo theory solvers to attack the thusly formulated problem.
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Interestingly enough, these two publications—or others in the same vein—, although they assume traditional state
estimators, are a variant on fooling controllers through the input data presented to them. Recall that ANNs can
approximate functions and RNNs dynamic systems, approaches to replace traditional state estimators with ANNs are
obvious, with one of the more recent examples coming from Manitsas, Singh, Pal, et al. [129]. These approaches
are susceptible to their very own form of AL, i.e., also suffer from bad data injection. Hu, Wang, Han, et al. [133]
offer a recent description of this problem. Countermeasures are being taken, ironically, not by hardening the ANN
themselves, as the authors of the publications discussed in the previous Section 1 have tried to do, but by using other
ANNs to detect the attack. He, Mendis, and Wei [134] promise real-time detection of false data injection using a
DNN; Mousavian, Valenzuela, and Wang [135] and Abbaspour, Yen, Noei, et al. [136] undertake a similar endeavor,
differing only in the type of network and data encoding they use.
CPS are not purely technical, but almost always have an economical perspective. For the power grid, markets and
pricing schemes exist that can subject to exploitation. In this perspective, the attack is not motivated by the goal to
physically destroy a piece of infrastructure, but by maximizing profits. Not necessarily is this entailed by a mere
violation of the rules; market design is complex enough that a businessman can stage an exploit by following the rules
by the letter instead of by intent. In this regard, Hirth and Schlecht [137] show how a zonal redispatch market—such as
the model Germany employs—can be gamed. In this market model based on zones (e.g., north and south), congestion
can lead to redispatch of generation or consumption. If, by the merit order principle, a power plant in the north zone
would normally supply power, but cannot, because the link between the north and south zones is congested (i.e., the
physical line would be loaded beyond the physical safety limit), the generation is redispatched to the south, meaning
that a more expensive power plant in the south zone supplies the power needed and the redispatched power plant in the
north zone receives a compensation for foregone profits. Using AI-based prediction, a power plant operator can predict
redispatch beforehand and enter the initial bidding phase with much lower variable costs, betting on first awarded the
contract to generate money while also predicting the redispatch to receive the compensation instead of generating at a
loss. This specific form of economic attack is called inc-dec gaming. Similar observations have been made for Great
Britain by Konstantinidis and Strbac [138].
Ju and Lin [131] have shown that very little knowledge of the power grid as specific CPS is needed to attack it; however,
the attacker still requires the minimal knowledge of the CPS itself as well as the reactive power injection control
rule, i.e., minimal domain-specific knowledge. The concept of Adversarial Resilience Learning (ARL) by Fischer,
Memmen, Veith, et al. [139] goes beyond specific CPS domains in that it does not require domain-specific knowledge,
but only a minimal description of sensors and actuators of an agent, whereminimalmeans themathematical description
of the observation or action space, respectively, such as “discrete 1, 2, . . . , 10” or “continuous [0; 1]”. In ARL, attacker
and defender agents work against each other—but without knowledge of their respective counterpart—on a shared
model of a CPS, training each other in the process. The attacker tries to de-stabilize the CPS (where the notion of
stability is up to the experimenter to define), whereas the defender tries to ensure a resilient operation of the CPS.
Over time, the attacker finds attack vectors, whereas the defender learns strategies to keep the CPS operational. This
is the second distinguishing feature of ARL, in that it provides not only analysis through the attacker, but also tries to
produce a operation strategy.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we have provided a literature review of techniques for CPS design and analysis, beginningwith the basics
of temporal logic and requirements that serve to formally specify the CPS’ components at hand. We have touched
methods for program synthesis, i.e., ways to generate programs from a formal specification. We have then extensively
covered the use of ANNs as controllers, e.g., as replacements for classical control loops, and how falsification is applied
to cover the safety requirements of a CPS. We have seen that DL has great potential, but also increases the uncertainty
of such systems considerably. Going from component to system level, we have covered simulation frameworks for
CPS. Afterwards, we have broadened the perspective, and included MAS as communicating, distributed problem-
solvers that nowadays not only can, but do control vast CPS. Finally, we have considered attack vectors in terms of
malicious actions against a CPS.
Obviously, AI research in perspective of CPS introducesmuch uncertainty and often breaks the required rigid assertion
of liveness and, especially, safety requirements in this domain. The benefits make the risk beneficial, can by no means
eschew the need for developing assertion methods towards a verified AI. We also believe that reversing the situation
and putting AI to use to analyse a CPS for its safety requirements, even without CPS domain knowledge required, will
provide a valuable path for a beneficial collaboration of the two research domains.
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